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Unnatural Competition?: Applying
the New Antitrust Learning to Foster
Competition in the Local Exchange
by
ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT*

Introduction
Over three years have passed since the adoption by Congress, in
February of 1996, of the much-heralded Telecommunications Act of
1996 ("the Act").' The popular and political response to the Act at
the time of its passage was extraordinarily enthusiastic. The Act was
hailed as a harbinger of technological miracles and vigorous
competition. It was said that the Act's provisions would end the
existing bottleneck monopolies controlled by local exchange
telephone companies ("LECs"), and would also erode the existing de
facto monopolies controlled by local cable television operators.
Indeed, so confident were the authors of the Act that cable
competition would emerge that they scheduled essentially all rate
regulation of cable television to end in March of 1999.2 The future of
local telephone competition was less certain, but the Act imposed a
number of obligations on LECs that were designed to create local
competition. Furthermore, the Act sought to create incentives for
LECs to cooperate in the development of local competition by
offering the carrot that once the Bell Operating Company LECs
complied with certain competition-permitting requirements, they
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law
<bhagwata@uchastings.edu>. B.A. 1986 Yale University; J.D. 1990 The University of
Chicago. I would like to thank Joseph Kearney for his helpful comments, Matt Borden for
excellent research assistance, and the participants at this Symposium for valuable
feedback.
1. See Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.). The Telecommunications Act of 1996 primarily amended the existing
provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, which has been codified in Title 47 of the
United States Code.
2. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 301(b), 47 U.S.C. § 543(b)(4) (1998).
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would be permitted to enter into the long-distance telephone market
from which they had been long excluded. 3 That provision, it was
hoped and expected, would provide the requisite impetus for LEC
cooperation, and so create openings that other telecommunications
firms would then take advantage of to enter the local market.
Over three years later, it is fair to say a consensus has emerged
that the impact of the Telecommunications Act has been
disappointing. Cable and local telephony remain essentially complete
monopolies, and the primary impact of the Act seems to have been to
trigger a wave of mega-mergers within the industry, with no
discernable beneficial impact on consumers. The best that can be said
in defense of the Act is that three years is too soon to judge, and that
we must wait and see what the true impact of the Act will be
(especially because full effectiveness of the Act has been delayed by4
extensive litigation challenging the FCC's implementation of it).
However, as time passes and competition fails to develop, serious
questions must be asked about whether the Act's fundamental
approach towards fostering local competition, which is to remove
legal entry barriers, mandate interconnection, but otherwise rely on
market forces to induce entry and competition, is likely to be an
effective one.
The thesis of this paper is that for reasons both theoretical and
practical, the model of competition upon which the local competition
provisions of the Telecommunications Act is premised is an
inadequate one, and that therefore the Act does not go far enough in
fostering local telephone competition. In particular, this paper
suggests that the economic model underlying the Act, which is
essentially the model of neoclassical price theory as interpreted by the
so-called Chicago School, incorporates a static view of competition
and an exaggerated faith in entry and market forces, which therefore
underestimates the potential for anticompetitive results in
unregulated markets. This paper draws upon recent learning in the
antitrust field to suggest that even if competition is in principle
possible in local telephone markets, the current structure and
circumstances of those markets make them susceptible to effective,
anticompetitive conduct by incumbent LECs. Unless checked, such
conduct is capable of indefinitely postponing entry by potential rivals.
Therefore, this paper concludes, serious thought needs to be given to
the possibility of reforming the Act, or implementing it in ways, so
that the resulting regulatory structure does not merely permit
competitive entry into local telephony, but rather actively encourages
and fosters such entry. In particular, it may be time to consider
3. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 271,47 U.S.C. § 271 (1998).
4. See, e.g., AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366,119 S. Ct. 721 (1999).
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whether constraining (and to some extent handicapping) LEC
incumbents is necessary, so that a competitive market structure can
take root free of anticompetitive interference.
1. Fables of the Divestiture
Before delving into the details of economic models and the
competition-permitting provisions of the 1996 Telecommunications
Act, it is informative to begin with a story-the story of the
development of competition in the long-distance telephone industry
following the breaking up of the vertically integrated Bell System in
the early 1980s. This story is relevant in two different ways. First of
all, most people consider the evolution of competition in longdistance telephony to be a success story, and indeed it is quite clear
that developments in the long-distance industry provided the impetus,
and the model, for the local competition provisions of the 1996 Act.
But second, there is an oddity in the story of long-distance
competition. Competition has in fact developed in the long-distance
industry (albeit imperfect competition), but there is a substantial
argument that it should not have, given conditions in the industry at
the time. Why competition nonetheless did develop is a complex
story, which offers interesting lessons for local competition.
When in 1984 the old Bell System was broken up, it was believed
that technological changes over the past two decades (in particular,
the advent of microwave technology) had rendered obsolete the
traditional assumption that long-distance telephony was an industry
with natural monopoly characteristics, because microwaves do not
share the large fixed costs, large capacity, and small incremental costs
Nonetheless, according to the
typical of wireline networks.
Department of Justice, the Bell System had been able to retain
monopoly control over long distance (as well as equipment
manufacturing) by using its continuing local monopoly power to
impede entry into those markets. The theory behind the Divestiture
was therefore that once the local exchange monopoly bottlenecks of
the Bell System were divided from potentially competitive markets
such as long distance and equipment manufacturing, competition
could develop in these markets because the companies controlling the
local monopolies would no longer have any incentive to favor AT&T
5
(which controlled the competitive portions of the old Bell empire).
So, the theory went, once those barriers to competition had been
lifted, AT&T's existing long-distance rivals (who were small but
5. See generally United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C.

1982); Joseph Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the Telecommunications Act
Regulation of Telecommunications UnderJudge Green, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1395 (1999).
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growing at the time) and new entrants could challenge AT&T's
effective monopoly in long distance, and competition could flourish.
And flourish it did, so that 15 years later most people would6
agree that the long-distance market is at least workably competitive.
By the mid-1990s three major competitors existed in the long-distance
industry (AT&T, MCI, and Sprint), as well as hundreds of minor7
players, and AT&T's market share had declined to about 50%.
Indeed, competition had become sufficiently well rooted that in
November of 1995, prior to the passage of the 1996 Act, the FCC
adopted an order declaring that AT&T was no longer the "dominant"
long-distance carrier, and therefore freeing AT&T from the
asymmetric regulation to which it had been subject. 8 Certainly not all
agree that competition in long distance has been a complete success,
and there are continuing, serious claims of oligopolistic
interdependence among the big three long-distance carriers;9 but on
the whole, the Bell System Divestiture has been considered by most
to be a true success story in the modem annals of "deregulation."
What is odd about the fable I have just recounted is that though
events following the Divestiture appear to have largely met the
expectations of its framers, all indications are that they should not
have. This is because by the mid-1980s, when interexchange
competition was first taking root, the technological story underlying
the Divestiture was already out of date. Instead of microwave, the
dominant technology in the long-distance industry was rapidly
becoming fiber optics, a technology that appears to possess the same
(and indeed arguably greater) natural-monopoly cost characteristics
as traditional copper wires. If, as seems likely, it is correct that fiber
optics possesses natural monopoly characteristics, then arguably by
the late 1980s AT&T should have been able to consistently offer
services at prices lower than any of its rivals (since AT&T, by virtue
of its size, should have possessed far greater economies of scale, and
lower costs, than any other company), and so should have been able
to reestablish its monopoly position. Indeed, Paul MacAvoy and
Kenneth Robinson suggested this possibility as early as 1983,10 and
6. See, e.g., David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Competition and Asymmetric
Regulation in Long-Distance Telecommunications: An Assessment of the Evidence, 4

COMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 1 (1996); Simran K. Kahai et al., Is the "Dominant Firm"
Dominant? An EmpiricalAnalysis ofAT&T's Market Power, 39 J.L. & ECON. 499 (1996).

7. Kasserman & Mayo, supra note 6, at 2.
8. See In re AT&T Corp., 11 F.C.C.R. 3271 (1995).
9. See PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE FAILURE OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION TO
ESTABLISH COMPETITION iN LONG-DISTANCE TELEPHONE SERVICES (1996).

10. See Paul W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Winning By Losing: The AT&T
Settlement and Its Impact on Telecommunications,1 YALE J.ON REG. 1, 31 (1983) ("[T]he
divestiture will specifically convey some natural monopoly advantages to AT&T....
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soon after, in 1987, Peter Huber also raised such concerns in his
Geodesic Network report written on behalf of the Department of
Justice.' Since then, Paul MacAvoy has reiterated this theory, that
AT&T has the capability to recover market share at will. 12 Under this
view, true13long-distance competition could not, and should not have
emerged.
So what happened? Assuming (as I am inclined to do, contrary
to Huber and MacAvoy) that AT&T did not (and continues not to)
simply voluntarily forego increasing its market share, the answer
appears to be that during the 1980s, competition between AT&T and
its major rivals (primarily MCI and Sprint) did not occur on a level
playing field. Instead regulators, including both the FCC and state
PUCs, heavily handicapped AT&T, both through onerous,
asymmetric regulatory requirements and through imposition of
higher costs. First, during this period AT&T was subject to tariffing
requirements-i.e., a regulatory obligation that all services provided
by AT&T be pursuant to filed tariffs, which were in turn subject to
regulatory and private challenge-to which no other long-distance
carrer was subject. 14 In addition, and even more significantly, during
the years immediately following Divestiture AT&T paid substantially
higher "access charges" to LECs than its rivals, on the order of 55
percent higher in fact (access charges are charges paid by longdistance carriers to local exchange carriers because of the fact that all
long-distance phone calls must pass through the networks of local
exchange carriers at both ends of the call).' 5 Finally, as commentators
noted at the time, AT&T was subject to any number of other
asymmetric, and quite burdensome regulatory obligations during this
period imposed by both federal and state regulators, to which no
other interexchange carrier was subject.16 In toto, these additional
[T]he competition currently in existence has survived only because of the regulatory
'umbrella' that kept AT&T rates up. When the umbrella folds and the [rival carriers] are
made to pay full access charges, the competition will also fold.").
11. See PETER W. HUBER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE GEODESIC NETWORK: 1987
REPORT ON COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY 3.1-3.7 (1987).

12. See MACAvoY, supra note 9, at 93-98.
13. See generally Lee L. Selwyn & Patricia D. Kravtin, Long-Run Regulation of
AT&T: A Key Element of a Competitive TelecommunicationsPolicy, TELEMATICS, Aug.
1984 at 12; Lee L. Selwyn, Assessing Market Power and Competition in the
TelecommunicationsIndustry: Toward an EmpiricalFoundationfor Regulatory Reform, 40
FED. COMM. L.J. 193,207 (1998).
14. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel., 512 U.S. 218,220-23 (1994).
15. See MACAvOY, supra note 9, at 45; Huber, supra note 11, at 3.5-3.6. The
justification for this surcharge was that AT&T enjoyed a superior quality of access to local
exchange networks than its rivals, since presubscription and 1 + dialing had not yet been
implemented by the newly divested Bell Operating Companies.
16. See David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Long-distance Telecommunications
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obligations necessarily raised AT&T's costs substantially, and
artificially, above levels it might have attained in an unregulated
environment, and also above the costs faced by its rivals. As a result
these rivals were able to acquire substantial market share at AT&T's
7
expense during the first few, crucial years following Divestiture.1
In 1987, the most important regulatory disadvantage faced by
AT&T, which was the 55% surcharge on the local access charges it
paid, was removed.' 8 During the 1990s AT&T also successfully
challenged the FCC's asymmetric tariffing policies, which had
subjected AT&T alone to tariffing requirements.' 9 And by the end of
1995, the FCC removed most of the remaining asymmetric federal
requirements by holding that AT&T was no longer the "dominant"
carrier in most domestic markets. 20 By the time these asymmetries
were phased out, or even reduced substantially, however, AT&T's
rivals in the long-distance industry, notably MCI and Sprint, were
sufficiently entrenched that a stable competitive environment had
been created in the industry. Long-distance firms other than AT&T
were too well known and had too much physical plant in the ground
for them to be seriously vulnerable to predatory activity by AT&T.
In particular, by a decade after the Divestiture, AT&T's rivals had
deployed sufficient, fully-developed fiber optic networks that by this
time AT&T owned less than half of the deployed fiber in the
country.21 As a result, the long-distance industry already possessed
substantial excess capacity, most of which was not owned by the
putative dominant firm, and the marginal cost of activating that
capacity was quite small. Furthermore, the smaller firms in the
industry enjoyed sufficient name recognition to have developed a
loyal customer base. In short, the long-distance market had evolved
to a point where it was utterly implausible to think that AT&T could
force its rivals to exit the market, and it therefore was simply too late
for AT&T to regain its long-distance monopoly.

Policy-Rationalityon Hold, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 22, 1988, at 18.
17. See MACAVOY, supra note 9, at 83-85 (noting sharp decline in AT&T's market
share from 1984 to 1989).
18. Despite the elimination of the surcharge, regulators have continued to
disadvantage AT&T somewhat by denying it cost-based and volume-based discounts on
access charges to which it would otherwise be entitled. See MACAVOY, supra note 9, at
51-57.
19. See MCI Telecomm. Corp., 512 U.S. at 220-23.
20. See in re AT&T Corp., 11 F.C.C.R. at 3281.
21. See MACAVOY, supra note 9, at 93-98.
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H. The Chicago School and "Post-Chicago": A Tale of Two
Models
The story of the development of competition in long-distance
telephony set forth above is one of evolution, regulatory
management, and to some extent serendipity. In essence it suggests
that if regulators had truly "deregulated" the long-distance industry
in 1984 and created an even playing field for all competitors, as
purists would have had it, competition would never have emerged in
the industry. Instead, AT&T would have been able to take advantage
of its greater economies of scale to force out its fledgling rivals, as
natural monopoly theory dictates, and reestablish dominance. It is
only because of regulatory intervention, and the handicapping of
AT&T during the first decade of competition, that that result did not
prevail.
Despite its visceral appeal, however, this story appears to be
nonsensical from the perspective of traditional economic theories of
natural monopoly and neoclassical price theory, especially as
interpreted by the so-called "Chicago School" of law and economics.
Neoclassical price theory is the dominant theoretical approach of the
Chicago School, and provided much of the theoretical basis for the
2
revolutions in both antitrust and regulatory policy during the 1980s.
For example, Chicago School price theory has been deployed by both
scholars and the courts to criticize antitrust claims alleging "predatory
pricing." More generally, Chicago School scholars have pervasively
deployed price theoretic arguments to contend that cartel-like
behavior among competing firms tends to be unstable, the general
threat of entry tends to make anticompetitive conduct unprofitable,
and firms tend to react rationally to anticompetitive conduct by their
rivals. As a consequence, antitrust law should be extremely dubious
of claims brought by rivals of exclusionary practices by firms with
market power.24 The impact of the Chicago School on regulatory
policy is less obvious than on antitrust policy, but is almost certainly
22. The two most prominent applications of Chicago School price theory to antitrust
issues are ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLIcY AT WAR WITH

ITSELF (1978) and RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERsPEcTIvE (1976). Since the time those studies were published, the Chicago School's
version of price theory has also become the dominant analytic mode employed by the
Supreme Court in antitrust cases. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
23. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 22, at 144-60; Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory
Strategies and Counterstrategies,48 U. Cm. L. REV. 263 (1981); Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
24. For a general summary of the Chicago School approach, see Herbert Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 226-33 (1985), and sources cited
therein.
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reflected in the massive wave of deregulation and unbundling that has
swept through regulated industries in the past two decades32
Price theory was of course not the creation of the Chicago
School. Price theory has been the dominant model of microeconomic
analysis in this century. 26 The most notable characteristic, for the
purposes of this paper, of the price theoretic approach to economics is
that it tends to analyze markets based on cost structures and expected
partial equilibria in specific markets, rather than focusing on the
competitive process itself. Put differently, neoclassical models tend to
base their analysis on a static view of competition, which emphasizes
the expected results of competition, but does not give serious
attention to how the behavior of individual firms leads the market to
those predicted equilibria. The Chicago School's particular take on
neoclassical price theory has refined and, if anything, exaggerated this
tendency, because of the Chicago tendency to sharply discount the
possibility that "barriers to entry" or other market imperfections
might lead markets to deviate from predicted, competitive
equilibria. 27 The ultimate result is a model that is skeptical about the
possibility of successful anticompetitive behavior or results, and so
tends to strongly oppose governmental intervention in markets as a
means to "protect" or "foster" competition. 28
The price theoretic approach to so-called "natural monopoly"
industries fully reflects this tendency. An industry constitutes a
"natural monopoly" if over the relevant range of demand, the
production technology for the good in question demonstrates
declining marginal and average costs, so that a single firm is able to
supply the entire market at a lower cost than two or more firms,
thereby making monopoly the most efficient form of organization for
that market.29 Basic price theory would therefore suggest that if a
25. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated IndustriesLaw, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1400-03 (1998).
26. Probably the leading work establishing the role of price theory in modem
economics was Alfred Marshall's PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890). Since then, of
course, any number of scholars including notably Paul Samuelson have contributed to the
refinement and precise mathematical formulation of the neoclassical price theory model.
See, e.g., PAUL ANTHONY SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1947).
For a good, general summary of the current state of microeconomic theory see WALTER
NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS (5th ed.
1992).
27. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Barriers To Entry, AM. ECON. REV., March 1982, at 47.
28. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1984).
29. See NICHOLSON, supra note 26, at 560; Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and
Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548, 548 (1969). A somewhat more sophisticated version
of the theory of natural monopoly, incorporating the notion of "subadditivity," is set forth
in WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 17, ch. 8 (1982).

August 1999]

UNNATURAL COMPETITON

market does indeed demonstrate those characteristics it will
inevitably evolve into a monopoly, and so any attempt to introduce
competition is quixotic. The traditional solution to this problem was
price regulation, though scholars associated with the Chicago School
have suggested that because of the possibility of entry and the high
costs of regulation, even this may not be a sensible response.30 If, on
the other hand, the efficient scale of production in an industry is not
monopolistic, entry will occur, and competition will develop. In
either case, short-term regulatory responses are irrelevant to the
ultimate competitive structure of industry.
Since the 1980s, however, at least in the antitrust arena the
heyday of neoclassical price theory and the Chicago School approach
appears to have passed.31 Instead a "new learning," sometimes
described as the "post-Chicago" School of economics, 32 has emerged.
This approach introduces tools such as game theory; assorted models
of "strategic behavior," "foreclosure," and "raising rivals' costs";
awareness of network effects; and path dependency theory to
antitrust analysis. The primary commonality among many of the new
approaches, which distinguishes them from the Chicago School, is
that they tend to focus more on the details of the competitive process
than does price theory. Otherwise, the new learning runs a broad
gamut, with some theories, especially the game theoretic literature,
representing a fundamental shift away from neoclassical economics,
while other theories such as "network effects" and "raising rivals'
costs" are more properly described as refinements, albeit significant
ones, of the price theoretic model. This learning suggests that under
certain circumstances, anticompetitive practices, which have been
largely discounted by the Chicago School approach, can in fact be
feasible, profitable strategies for dominant firms to pursue. Examples
of such practices include predatory pricing, exclusionary vertical
contracting or integration, "price or supply squeezes," and assorted
other forms of exclusionary behavior. More generally, theories based
on "network effects," path dependency, and more nuanced models of
consumer behavior suggest that free, unregulated markets will fail to
produce socially optimal results far more often than neoclassical price
theory would suggest. Therefore, governmental intervention can
often be a necessary and beneficial tool in guiding markets towards
efficient outcomes. While perhaps no particular aspect of this new
learning is sufficient to undermine the laissez faire prescriptions of the
30. See Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968); Posner,
supra note 29, at 618-20.
31. For a general description of this new learning, see supra note 24, at 213.
32. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 225; Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the
Normative Foundationsof Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C.L. Rev. 219,222 (1995).
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Chicago School, in toto these models do suggest that at least under
certain, perhaps limited circumstances, regulatory intervention is
indeed more desirable than has been thought in recent years.
Perhaps the most significant component of the new learning to
which I refer is the recent literature regarding game theoretic models
of predatory behavior by firms, notably predatory pricing models.33
These theories rely crucially on the existence of asymmetric
information between predator firms, typically dominant incumbents,
and victims, typically entrants or fringe firms. Certain conditions
must be met for predation to be feasible, notably a concentrated
market, high barriers to entry, and the existence of a dominant
incumbent? 4 But if those conditions are met, these models suggest
that predatory behavior such as predatory pricing may be a rational,
profitable strategy for a dominant firm to pursue, enabling it to
develop a "reputation" as a tough competitor willing to fight off
challenges, or to falsely "signal" information regarding costs and
demand structures within the market in dispute. Notably, this
approach to predatory pricing implies no particular relationship to
costs, contrary to the assumptions of the Chicago predatory pricing
models.
In addition to the specific analysis of predatory pricing, a related
literature has also evolved applying tools of game theory to suggest
the feasibility of "strategic entry deterrence" by dominant firms.35
Again, the crucial insight here is that a dominant firm, by making
"binding commitments and communicating them" to potential
entrants, such as by incurring large sunk costs, is able to prevent entry
even by more efficient rivals by signaling that such entry would be
unprofitable. 36 In addition, a dominant firm may be able to engage in
"limit pricing" to take advantage of informational asymmetries
between incumbents and entrants, and so to deter entry by misleading

33. For good, general descriptions within the legal literature of the new game theoretic
models, see Alexander C. Larson & William E. Kovacic, PredatoryPricingSafeguards in
Telecommunications Regulation: Removing Impediments to Competition, 35 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 1, 30-33 (1990); Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of
Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 240-45 (1995); Louis Kaplow, Extension of
Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 515, 527-31 (1985); James E.
Meeks, Predatory Behavior as an Exclusionary Device in the Emerging
Telecommunications Industry, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 125, 132 & n.28 (1998); Gregory
T. Gundlach & Joseph P. Guiltinan, A Marketing Perspective on Predatory Pricing, 43
ANTrIRUST L.J. 883, 893-95 (1998).
34. See Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 275 n.291.
35. See, e.g., Steven C. Salop, StrategicEntry Deterrence, AM. ECON. REV., May 1979,
at 335; Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 260-70; cf. Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law,
42 STAN. L. REv. 1291,1304-07 (1990).
36. See Salop, supra note 35, at 335.
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potential entrants regarding the incumbent's cost structure. 37 The
crucial point is that as with predatory pricing, these kinds of strategic
behavior permit a dominant firm to exploit superior information and
dominant market position to impede competition in ways not
predicted by the Chicago School.
A substantial literature has also developed regarding the
possibility of profitable anticompetitive strategies based on "raising
rivals' costs." Steven Salop and Tom Krattenmaker presented what
remains the leading legal exposition of this theory in a 1986 article in
the Yale Law Journal.38 The key theme here is that it is possible to
envision a number of potentially profitable strategies whereby firms
take actions that have the effect of raising the production costs of
their competitors, without bearing much cost themselves. If such a
strategy is effective, moreover, the firm can then reap monopoly
profits without necessarily achieving monopoly market shares, or
even excluding its rivals (though exclusion is also a possible, perhaps
even likely end result of such a strategy). A prime example of such
behavior would be foreclosure through misuse of a bottleneck facility
controlled by a dominant firm, to which rivals require access, or
through other forms of "supply squeezes" which raise production
costs of rivals.39 Once again, the literature suggests that such conduct
can be employed by dominant firms to obtain anticompetitive results,
and so may require official intervention.
Some particularly relevant examples of dominant firm strategies
falling within the general rubrics of entry deterrence or raising rivals'
costs presented in recent economic literature involve dominant firms
misusing vertical integration or exclusive vertical contracting to harm
competitors or prevent entry into their markets.40 In general, these
papers suggest that contrary to standard Chicago School predictions,
when conditions are appropriate, vertical integration or foreclosure
by a dominant firm can provide an effective, profit maximizing
strategy for preventing entry or squeezing existing rivals. For
example, a dominant firm may seek to enter into exclusive supply or
dealing contracts with downstream purchasers, and so to prevent
rivals or entrants from achieving a minimum efficient scale by
foreclosing them from selling to a substantial part of the market.
37. See id. at 337.
38. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209 (1986); see also
Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 274-80; Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising
Rivals' Costs, AM. ECON. REV., May 1983, at 267.
39. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supranote 38, at 234-36.
40. See, e.g., Christodoulos Stefanadis, Selective Contracts, Foreclosure, and the
Chicago School View, 41 J.L. & ECON. 429 (1998); Michael H. Riordan, Anticompetitive
Vertical Integrationby a DominantFirm, AM. ECON. REv., Dec. 1998, at 1232.
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Such a strategy can prevent entry, or it can merely raise rivals' costs
41
and so ensure a stream of economic profits to the dominant firm.
Similarly, a dominant firm may be able to vertically integrate
upstream, into input markets, and so raise entry costs, or raise the
production costs of fringe firms, by controlling access to that input.
Such a strategy is only likely to be successful if the market is
characterized by a dominant firm and a fringe, but in that situation, if
necessary conditions are met, a dominant firm may well have the
incentive to manipulate input markets to prevent entry. 42 It should be
noted that this strategy is particularly relevant to local
telecommunications markets, because under the "unbundling"
provisions of the 1996 Telecommunications Act,43 incumbent LECs
are effectively dominant, vertically integrated firms that provide
necessary inputs to any putative entrants. 44
The types of strategies discussed above are specific examples of
the types of strategic behavior options available to dominant firms
seeking to foreclose entry, or maintain market power and earn
economic profits. A complete discussion of potential anticompetitive
strategies is beyond the scope of this paper. It is nonetheless quite
clear that in certain kinds of markets, characterized by dominant
incumbent firms, entry barriers, and sunk costs, successful
anticompetitive strategies remain very much a possibility.
Finally, in addition to identifying potentially effective
anticompetitive strategies by firms, a substantial body of new
literature, in both the economic and legal arenas, has begun to focus
on the demand side of markets, and potential market-distorting
consequences of particular demand structures.
One currently
prominent theory looks at so-called "network effects," which Mark
Lemley and David McGowan have defined as any situation where
consumers of a product derive utility from other users using the same,
or a compatible product.45 The telephone network is of course the
archetypal example of such a network, since the only utility obtained
by telephone users is the ability to connect to others using the
network. 46 Network effects can create a cascade/tipping situation,
where once one firm becomes dominant, the very fact of dominance
41. See Stefandis, supra note 40, at 431 (citing other literature criticizing the Chicago
School's rejection of anticompetitive uses of exclusive dealing).
42. See Riordan, supra note 40, at 1233-34, 1246.
43. See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, §§ 251-252,47 U.S.C. §§ 251-252.
44. See Riordan, supra note 40, at 1234-35.
45. See Mark A. Lemley and David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network
Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 483-84 (1998); see also James B. Speta,
Handicappingthe Race for the Last Mile?:A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband
Platforms, 17 YALE J. REG. (forthcoming 1999).
46. See id. at 488-89.
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makes its product more desirable to consumers, and so permits the
firm to retain its dominance or develop a monopoly, even if otherwise
the firm's product is more expensive or of lower quality.47
Furthermore, the existence of network effects can create incentives
for firms to engage in anticompetitive behavior such as leveraging or
predatory pricing, because of the enormous benefits obtained by firstmovers in network industries, and because a network monopoly, once
established, is quite difficult to dislodge through entry.48 In
particular, in a recent paper Carl Shapiro has demonstrated that
exclusive dealing is an especially great anticompetitive concern in
network industries.49 The implications for local telecommunications
markets are obvious.5 °
The network effects theory is not a departure, but only a
refinement of price theory. Price theoretic models have been
criticized more broadly for their treatment of demand as entirely
static, and exogenous to market structure or development.51
Especially
in
technically
dynamic
industries
such
as
telecommunications, demand is anything but static, and there is every
reason to think that firms, especially firms in rivalry, create demand
by introducing new products and technology, and by making it
possible for other parts of the economy to in turn develop uses for a
new technology (especially an infrastructure technology such as
52
telecommunications). That is, "Build it and they will come.
Innovation and the resulting market dynamism that it can engender
are not inevitable, however, nor are they well modeled by static, price
theoretic approaches. For example, most observers would agree that
innovation is far more likely to occur in rivalrous industries than in
monopolistic ones, but there is nothing in the basic neoclassical model
that explains why this is so. As a result, however, in technologically
dynamic industries, rivalry itself may create demand by speeding up
the rate of innovation. What the possibility of demand endogeneity
suggests is that even if at current demand levels in a particular market
competition may not be viable (i.e., the industry is naturally
47. See id.
at 495-97.
48. See icL at 496.
49. See Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 GEo. MASON L. REV. 673

(1999).
50. Despite this, those implications will be discussed in more detail in Part III of this

paper.
51. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations:A PhilosophicalCritique of (a
ParticularType of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1198, 1207-08 (1997); Cass
Sunstein, Endogeneous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J.LEGAL STUD. 217 (1993);
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 4,
49-54 (1994); GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTE (1996).

52. Cf Field of Dreams,starring Kevin Costner.
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monopolistic), it may well be socially beneficial in the long term for
regulators to encourage entry, and foster competition for a time
because the resulting rivalry may transform the industry into a
workably competitive one by increasing demand.5 3 Of course, if the
development of demand in the face of innovation and new technology
were completely predictable one might expect firms to invest in
research and enter existing monopolistic markets without regulatory
intervention (though the need to invest substantial sunk costs to enter
might still deter entry). But great uncertainty regarding the existence
and magnitude of demand effects makes such decisions less likely.
Most of the "new learning" described above is, in truth, not
really very new. Much of the basic game theoretic literature referred
to was written in the 1980s, beginning in 1982.54 Furthermore, as
early as 1985 Herbert Hovenkamp was writing about post-Chicago
antitrust.5 5 During the 1980s, however, this new academic thinking
had only a limited influence on antitrust and regulatory policy, which
was still in the process of incorporating the Chicago School insights of
the previous decade. In the past decade, however, it is fair to say that
the new learning has entered into antitrust policy and law to a
substantial extent. Such analysis appears to be influencing current
antitrust policy, the recent Justice Department prosecution of
Microsoft being the most visible (though by no means the only)
example. In the judicial arena, some scholars have argued that the
56
Court's 1992 decision in Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services
represented a turning point, in which the Court indicated a
willingness to incorporate into its antitrust analysis "post-Chicago"
approaches, such as a focus on transaction costs.5 7 The point should
not be overstated-there is no doubt that today's antitrust law is still
dominated by Chicago School thinking (and that is probably a good
thing). But at least with respect to the strongest laissez-faire
implications of the Chicago approach, the tide appears to have
turned, and antitrust decisionmakers seem increasingly willing to hear

53. It should be recalled that the concept of natural monopoly, based as it is on
production cost curves, has meaning only for a particular level of demand. As demand
increases, almost any industry is likely to face rising marginal costs, and so lose its natural
monopoly status.
54. See, e.g., David Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information,27
J. ECON. THEORY 253 (1982); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation,Reputation, and
Entry Deterrence, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 280 (1982); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANiZATiON 361-88 (1988).
55. See Hovenkamp, supranote 24.
56. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
57. See, e.g., Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust
Economics,74 N.C. L. REv. 219,246-47 (1995).
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post-Chicago arguments. 58 Given the close, if sometimes antagonistic

relationship between antitrust and regulatory policy, it seems
appropriate that regulatory policy begin to take account of this new
learning as well.
The above analysis including both the feasibility of
anticompetitive strategies and possibility of demand-side effects,

suggests that there may be a place for regulatory intervention in
certain industries (notably ones with dominant, incumbent firms) on a
transitionalbasis, including fostering competition by encouraging
entry which might not otherwise occur. Such intervention can be
phased out once the market acquires a structure making
anticompetitive activity difficult, and competition viable.5 9 The next

section discusses some of the ways in which such interventions might
be pursued in the telecommunications context.

m.

Implications: Fostering Competition in the Local
Exchange
The implications for regulatory policy of the "new learning"
described above, and in particular for telecommunications policy, are
complex but important. Notably, the new theories of anticompetitive
behavior developed in recent years, especially the new game theoretic
models of predatory pricing through "signaling" and strategic
deterrence, have strong implications for regulators who wish to create
competition in previously monopolistic markets. What the new
anticompetitive theories have in common is that they suggest that

market dominance, usually combined with asymmetric information
regarding cost and demand conditions as well as substantial sunk
costs of entry, are necessary prerequisites for the sorts of
58. For proof that the new learning has truly entered the mainstream, see The
Economics of Antitrust, THE ECONOMIST, May 2, 1998 at 62-64.
59. The fact that the regulatory intervention this paper advocates is transitional
distinguishes it from the "partial-industry regulation" advocated by Ian Ayres and John
Braithwaite. Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Partial-IndustryRegulation: A Monopsony
Standard for Consumer Protection, 80 CAL. L. Rav. 13 (1992). Ayres and Braithwaite
point out that dominant firms are capable of engaging in a variety of anticompetitive
practices, such a predatory prices, which may justify regulatory intervention, see id. at 1920; and also point out that protection or support of fringe firms has the potential to
improve market performance. See id. at 23-27. Indeed, they specifically cite the example
of asymmetric regulation of AT&T as an example of successful partial-industry regulation.
See id. at 49. In these respects, their arguments clearly parallel the positions set forth in
this paper. Ayres and Braithwaite, however, appear to envision such asymmetric
regulation as a permanent condition, while the premise of this paper is that while
asymmetric regulation may be necessary to create appropriate initial conditions and
market evolution, the long run objective should be to eliminate asymmetry, so as to ensure
that the regulatory system is not preventing a dominant firm from achieving long term
efficiency.

1494
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sophisticated, anticompetitive strategies the theories posit. When
those conditions are met, however, anticompetitive behavior may be
effective in preventing new entry for prolonged periods of time, even
when a particular market is no longer (or never was) "naturally
monopolistic" in the classical sense. Predatory pricing and strategic
entry deterrence, price or supply squeezes by a vertically integrated
firm, and various foreclosure techniques, might well keep otherwise
viable competition at bay for a long time or even indefinitely. The
new demand-side learning confirms and reinforces these lessons.
Network theory suggests that in network industries, first-mover
advantages can be crucial, even outcome determinative, regardless of
whether an industry's cost structure is conducive to competition,
unless regulators act to distribute the benefits of network
externalities. 6°
Demand endogeneity suggests (perhaps more
controversially) that the very existence of rivalry and resulting
innovation can make a competitive market structure viable where
earlier it was not. Together, these insights argue that the
development of competition within certain kinds of markets is neither
inevitable nor impossible, but rather that it may require fostering, and
indeed, that the very process of fostering competition may have the
effect of making a competitive market structure viable where it
earlier was not. Once a competitive market structure has taken root,
however, it is likely to remain in place simply because strategic
behavior becomes more difficult without dominance, and demand
once created is unlikely to disappear.
Another, admittedly somewhat controversial, way of
characterizing the analysis presented here is that in some industries,
with special characteristics, competition itself may be a pathdependent process. Path dependency theory, as developed most
thoroughly in the past two decades by Brian Arthur, suggests that
because of the presence of "increasing returns," or "positive
feedback" within the economy, certain markets or sectors of the
economy are not likely to reach predictable equilibria as suggested by
conventional economic theory. Instead, in such markets initial
conditions, or random events, can result in the market moving along
"a particular path, the choice [of which] may become locked-in
regardless of the advantages of alternatives."' 61 The essential
60. How that might be done is discussed below.
61. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCY IN THE

ECONOMY 1 (1994); see also Paul David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM.
ECON. REv. 332 (1985). For an application of path dependency theory to legal issues,
see Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, PathDependence in Corporate Contracting:Herd
Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996). For summaries of path
dependency theory and criticism of its practical significance, see S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen
E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995);
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prerequisite for such path dependence, or "lock-in," is increasing
returns or positive feedback, meaning that as production by a
particular firm or of a particular product increases, the returns to be
gained from further production also increase. Such increasing returns
can occur either because the costs of production decline (which is the
conventional supply-side natural monopoly story), or because
demand side interactions such as network effects and the need for
standardization make the product more desirable to new purchasers
as the existing base of users expands.62 Once a particular market or
economic sector is set upon a particular path, the key insight is that
market forces alone will not be adequate to move to a new path, even
if that path is more socially efficient.
The key applications of path dependency theory until now have
been in analyzing the adoption of technological standards,63 and the
development of regional and national economies. 64 The theory also,
however, appears to be applicable to the market structure analysis
developed in this paper. That analysis argues that in an industry
characterized by entry barriers, high sunk costs, network effects, and
the presence of a dominant, incumbent firm, entry and competition
will not necessarily occur through the action of simple market forces.
Put differently, the feasibility of anticompetitive entry deterrence by
dominant firms may provide the kinds of "positive feedback"
necessary for path dependence, because the benefits of such strategic
behavior, as well as the benefits from any network effects, are
available only to large firms. In such a market, therefore, a
competitive industry structure may take root if, but only if, a
dominant firm is handicapped by regulators, and otherwise prevented
from exercising its dominant power, during the period when
competition is developing and the firm's dominance is being
eradicated. As Part I of this paper suggests, arguably that is what
happened in the long-distance telephone industry during the first
decade after Divestiture, and path dependency theory suggests that if
during that transitional period the dominant firm, AT&T, had
not been handicapped, a competitive market structure might never
have emerged. 65
Frederich W. Lambert, Path Dependent Inefficiency in the Corporate Construct: The
Uncertain Case with Less Certain Implications, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1077 (1998).
62. See ARTHUR, supra note 61, at 3-4.
63. See id, ch. 2.
64. See, e.g., iL, ch. 3; ELHANAN HELPMAN & PAUL KRUGMAN, MARKET
STRUCTURE AND FOREIGN TRADE (1985).

65. This conclusion should be contrasted with the traditional economic argument that
asymmetric regulation was a mistake because it prevented regulators from determining if
the long-distances industry "really was" a natural monopoly. See, e.g., Kasserman &
Mayo, supra note 16, at 18.
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What are the implications of this insight for the ongoing
regulatory attempts, under the authority of the 1996
Telecommunications Act, to create competition in the local telephone
exchange? A complete answer is of course impossible within the
constraints of this paper, but it should be obvious that the theories
and concerns noted in this paper are highly relevant to local
telephone markets. These markets are universally characterized by
dominant incumbents who are indeed monopolists-the LECs. Sunk
costs of entry are likely to be very high, at least for now, since
providing local exchange service requires installing a physical
network, or at least parts of one. Information is likely to be quite
asymmetric, since incumbent LECs possess vastly more knowledge
about the markets they serve than any new entrant, even such
powerful ones as interexchange carriers. As noted above, the
telephone industry is the archetypal example of an industry with
network effects (such effects are indeed often deployed to explain the
development of the Bell System monopoly in the first place). Finally,
the field is characterized by great technological dynamism, where
both cost structures and demand are evolving rapidly, and there is
great uncertainty regarding the effects on demand of deploying new
technology (such as fiber-to-the-curb and digital compression
technology). All of these factors indicate that conditions are ripe for
path-dependent competition, and the obvious question that arises is
what policymakers can do to ensure that these markets take the path
leading to competition.
In some ways, the above analysis suggests that in its efforts to
create local competition, the 1996 Telecommunications Act got it
exactly right. For example, in a physical network industry such as
telephony, there is a great danger that the dominant network will gain
or retain a monopoly due to increasing returns perceived by users
from hooking into that network. Such a result is not, however,
inevitable-a monopoly can be prevented by requiring the dominant
network to assure interconnection and interoperability with
competing networks, so that the increasing network returns are made
available to all competitors, rather than being appropriated by the
dominant network. 66 Therefore, the Act's strong emphasis on
mandated interconnection is essential, if the first mover (i.e., the
LEC) is not to achieve or retain dominance. 67 Of course, mandating
interconnection and achieving it are different things, and maintaining
nondiscrimination, parity, and interconnection will in reality require a
level of ongoing regulatory oversight which is a far cry from the
"deregulation" touted by the Act's sponsors.
66. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 45, at 549-50.
67. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 251,47 U.S.C. § 251(1998).
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In other ways, however, the Act is less than ideal; path
dependency analysis suggests that the 1996 Telecommunications Act
may not have gone far enough in its efforts to create local
competition. Insofar as the legislation relies on "natural market
forces" or Chicago-School type expectations of inevitable entry to
produce competition in the absence of natural-monopoly cost
structures, the expectations may not be met.68 Instead, recognition is
needed that entry may need to be encouraged, protected, fostered,
and even subsidized at first if it is to occur at any significant level. It
is probably too late to amend the legislation, 69 but at the least
administrators should keep this thought in mind in implementing the
Act.
As an example of the need for regulatory awareness of strategic
and path-dependency concerns, consider the current debate over the
appropriate prices that new entrants should have to pay for access to
LEC incumbents' network elements. 70 Many a forest has been felled
over this question, 71 but in truth, for policymakers the "correct"
resolution of this debate may ultimately be irrelevant. Suppose we
concede that the FCC's chosen measure, Total Element Long-Run
Incremental Cost ("TELRIC") is "inefficient," in that it insufficiently
compensates LECs (because it provides inadequate contribution to
existing, historical fixed or common costs, and denies recovery for
opportunity costs72), and Efficient Component Pricing Rule
("ECPR") favored by most commentators is "superior" in some
68. For a typical exposition of this position, see J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F.
Spulber, Deregulation and Managed Competition in Network Industries, 15 YALE J. ON
REG. 117, 127 (1998) (stating that regulating incumbents more heavily is "not
[because] market returns that can be earned by providing
necessary...
telecommunications services are reward enough to encourage entry").
69. It seems unlikely that the confluence of events which permitted all relevant
industry groups to sign on to the 1996 legislation will repeat itself in our lifetimes.
70. See generally AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, -, 119 S. Ct. 721, 728
(1999) (discussing FCC's adoption of "Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost
(TELRIC)" as the appropriate pricing measure, and upholding FCC's authority to require
state regulators to use TELRIC in pricing local network elements); cf WILLIAM J.
BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL TELEPHONY ch.7
(1994) (advocating "efficient component-pricing rule (ECPR)" for pricing inputs to
competitors).
71. See, e.g., William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Does the Constitution Require
that We Kill the Competitive Goose? PricingLocal Phone Service to Rivals, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1122 (1998); J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy of the
Telecommons: Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the
TelecommunicationsAct of 1996, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1081 (1997); 3. GREGORY SIDAK &
DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT

(1997).
7Z See Jim Chen, The Second Coming of Smyth v. Ames, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9 (1999)
(citing 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(d)(1)(3)).
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sense, because it reduces inefficient entry.73 Nonetheless, TELRIC
pricing of network components may make sense because it is a way of
encouraging entry in the face of fear of predation, and also a way of
reducing the danger that the incumbent will engage in a supply
squeeze, or targeted predation against an entrant. More generally,
TELRIC is more likely to bring firms into local exchange markets
piecemeal, making the risk of anticompetitive conduct by incumbents
less likely as they lose dominance, especially if the entry that does
occur is by innovative firms that are able to develop new market
niches (i.e., expand demand).74 This is of course a somewhat
unorthodox defense of TELRIC, suggesting as it does that on
occasion TELRIC will induce inefficient (meaning higher-cost) entry
but that this is not necessarily a bad thing if in the long run such entry
leads to the development of a sustainable, competitive market.
Similar logic also suggests that LECs, and not entrants, should bear
the non-recurring costs of transition to competition, 75 or at the least
that they be shared between LECs and entrants rather than imposed
entirely on entrants, as LECs argue with some economic justification
(because, as the LECs correctly point out, such transition costs are
caused by entrants, not LECs).
As with its requirements of interconnection, network
unbundling, and component pricing, the 1996 Act's provisions for
resale of retail LEC services are also crucial steps on the path to
competition, and must be fostered. Resale is particularly important
because by permitting non-facilities-based or piecemeal entry, it
sharply reduces the sunk costs of entry for firms (just as does the
interconnection and resale of elements obligations).7 6 And as with
element pricing, it may be sensible to foster entry by setting
artificially low wholesale prices (perhaps by sharply limiting the share
73. For a general description of TELRIC and ECPR, and the relative efficacy, see
Michael J. Doane et al., Having Your Cake-How to Preserve Universal-Service Cross
Subsides While FacilitatingCompetitive Entry, 16 YALE J. REG. 311,312, 317-320, 322-326
(1999).
74. I ignore the possibility that such a pricing rule might constitute an unconstitutional
"deregulatory taking," as Sidak and Spulber have argued extensively, see SIDAK &
SPULBER, supra note 71, because as a legal matter, I find it unlikely that such a claim
would succeed. For rebuttals to the "deregulatory takings" argument, see, for example,
William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Takings, Breach of the Regulatory
Contract, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1037 (1997); Jim
Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory Takings, 77 TEX. L. REV. 297 (1998); and Chen, supra
note 72.
75. For a discussion of such non-recurring costs, see Nicholas Economides, The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its Impact 15 (March 1998) (Discussion Paper ECN.Y.U.)
(available
at
Stern
School
of
Business,
98-08
<http://www.stem.nyu.edulnetworks/papers.html>).
76. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 25, at 1357-58 (1998).
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of overhead expenses a LEC may include in its wholesale prices). 77
Of course, such an approach has little intrinsic value, since a nonfacilities-based entrant, who only resells LEC services, is unlikely to
contribute towards a long-run competitive market structure. Even
though purely resale entry is of far less value than facilities-based
entry, however, such entry should be encouraged in the short run
because in the long run a piecemeal entrant might become
increasingly facilities based and so present a real challenge to the
incumbent's dominant status and ability to harm rivals.
Another strong implication of the predation and path
dependency concerns described above is that regulators should be
quite cautious about providing incumbent LECs regulatory relief,
including pricing flexibility, before putative entrants are established
as competitors. In the long run, of course, regulatory relief is
essential if competition is to yield substantial benefits. But the long
run is a long time (in the case of AT&T and the interexchange
market, it was almost 12 years), and during the transitional period
concerns about predation by the incumbent, and the related social
interest in fostering new carriers, should be an important
consideration against premature relief. The neoclassical objection to
this argument is of course that any entry fostered by price floors
78
imposed on incumbents is "inefficient" and should be discouraged;
but the obvious response should by now be clear - steps that are in
the long term unacceptable may be defensible as intermediate steps
necessary to create a competitive market. In particular, such actions
(or inaction, in the case of denying pricing flexibility) can be defended
as necessary to create conditions under which firms are willing to
enter local exchange markets, and to provide a breathing period
during which those new entrants can become sufficiently well
anticompetitive behavior and
established that they are able to resist
79
threats by the dominant incumbent.
77. Of course as with pricing components below true economic cost, such a wholesale
pricing rule is probably not efficient, in the sense that may induce inefficient entry.
However, as with TELRIC, such a rule may be defensible transitional measure, as a means
of altering existing market conditions that permit the incumbent to take advantage of its
dominance.
78. See Sidak & Spulber, supra note 68, at 125-26 (1998).
79. I would note that most of the arguments I have presented here apply with equal
force to the cable/video delivery industry, where again competitive entry has been
extremely scarce. Even well positioned LECs have hesitated to enter these markets in the
face of large sunk costs, uncertain demand, and concerns over predation. The lack of such
entry is particularly surprising in light of studies suggesting that quite limited economies of
scale are lost from cable overbuilds, see ROBERT CRANDALL AND HAROLD
FURCHTGOTT-RoTH, CABLE TV: REGULATION OR COMPETITION? 85 (1996). The lack
of competitive entry into cable suggests that the concerns raised in this paper are very
much relevant to the video distribution industry. The 1996 Act has not done much to
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Finally, aside from providing support for fostering, and frankly
subsidizing entrants, as well as maintaining sometimes cumbersome
regulation of incumbents, the anticompetitive concerns described in
Part II of this paper also justify the 1996 Act's approach in Section
271 of providing incumbent LECs with carrots-primarily in the form
of interexchange entry for Bell Operating Company LECs
("BOCs") 0-as a means of discouraging predatory and exclusionary
behavior. Strategic behavior is difficult for regulators to spot or
prevent, and oversight alone is unlikely to be sufficient to eliminate it,
or even to adequately control it. For example, predatory signaling
strategies are difficult to distinguish from targeted competitive
responses to entry, and price or supply squeezes through denial of
timely access to inputs can be masked as temporary delays or
unreasonable demands by new entrants (which, indeed, they
sometimes might be). Thus some incentive must be provided to the
incumbents to refrain from strategic conduct, and permit entry into
their markets. The Act seeks to do this through the quid pro quo of
interexchange entry if local entry occurs.
Unfortunately, current evidence suggests that this reward may be
inadequate to convince BOCs to give up lucrative local monopolies.
Nonetheless, the retention of some carrot seems essential if
anticompetitive behavior by the Bells is to be discouraged, which
provides a powerful argument against premature relief under Section
271 which would permit interexchange entry by BOCs before local
competition is well established.8 ' Of course, in deciding whether or
not to grant a particular BOC's petition to provide interexchange
services, the FCC must follow the statutory language of Section 271,
which appears to permit entry even before local competition is fully
established if the BOC has published an appropriate statement
indicating the terms and conditions on which it generally offers access
and interconnection to competitors. 82 However, Section 271 also
instructs the FCC to deny a BOC request for interexchange entry if it
believes such entry would be inconsistent "with the public interest,
convenience, and necessity. '83 The analysis presented here suggests
that the FCC should exercise this authority by setting especially
stringent standards for assessing a Section 271 application premised
remedy these concerns other than removing legal entry barriers, and the strong
implication of the argument I have presented here today is that that will not be enough.
80. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 271,47 U.S.C. § 271 (1998).
81. It should be noted that the argument set forth in this paper against interexchange
entry by Bell Operating Companies does not in any way rest on putative concerns about
anticompetitive effects in the interexchange market (a risk which I tend to discount).
82. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, §271(d)(3)(A)(ii), 47 U.S.C. §

271(d)(3)(A)(ii).
83. Id., §271(d)(3)(C), 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(C).
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on the mere publication of a statement of terms by a BOC, as
opposed to an application premised on the existence of actual,
84
facilities-based competition in the BOC's local exchange markets.
Conclusion
In the areas of antitrust and regulatory policy, as perhaps
everywhere, intellectual fashions move in cycles. From the Great
Depression through the 1960s, governmental intervention was the
favored response to perceived market problems, resulting in both an
aggressive antitrust enforcement policy and a commitment to
pervasive regulation of a broad range of industries, including many
structurally competitive industries where regulation was socially
disastrous such as natural gas production, aviation, and trucking.
Spurred on by the academic writings of the Chicago School and
Public Choice theorists who demonstrated the irrationality and social
waste engendered by much of the regulation and antitrust
enforcement of this era, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a sharp
backlash against governmental intervention. The watchwords of this
era were deregulation, laissez faire, and efficiency. By the late 1990s,
however, that counterrevolution has also passed its peak. Today, the
instinctive distrust of any governmental action, and the almost
religious faith in free markets, which characterized the deregulatory
movement, seem somewhat naive. There is a growing recognition
instead that unregulated markets do not necessarily operate perfectly,
that successful, anticompetitive behavior by firms is in fact far more
plausible and common than we perhaps thought, and that the social
costs of these phenomena are substantial. So, the cycle appears to be
turning back towards more government oversight of markets.
This paper is clearly part of this cyclical movement. It relies on
recent academic writing developing sophisticated models of strategic,
anticompetitive behavior by dominant firms to suggest that such
behavior should be very much of concern in the local
telecommunications markets that the 1996 Telecommunications Act
seeks to "deregulate" and make competitive. This paper also builds
upon other scholarship challenging the efficiency of unregulated
markets based on the related phenomena of network effects,
increasing returns, and path dependency.
Ultimately, the
84. Arguably, the FCC should adopt a policy under the public interest standard of
denying all Section 271 petitions that do not demonstrate the existence of actual local
competition. Such a policy, however, might be deemed illegal because it is inconsistent
with Congress's apparent intent, as expressed in Section 271, of permitting interexchange
entry before competition is established. In any event, the extent of the FCC's authority to
deny Section 271 petitions under the "public interest" standard is beyond the scope of this
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prescriptions offered are for greater governmental intervention into
local telephone markets, and indeed, intervention of a sort that
appears to violate the efficiency norms of the Chicago School
scholarship and the deregulatory movement.
In closing, therefore, it must be emphasized that the arguments
made here are not for a return to the bad old days of pervasive
regulation based on a visceral distrust of market forces. None of the
arguments undermine the cogent and now uncontroversial criticisms
of traditional regulatory schemes offered by the Chicago School.
Furthermore, there is no doubt that almost all of the deregulation and
regulatory reform (to say nothing of the reformulation of antitrust
law) implemented in response to the Chicago critique was necessary,
beneficial, and should under no circumstances be reversed. Instead,
what is offered is a much more modest proposal-a proposal for
limited, temporary, and nonpervasive regulatory action within
specific markets where competition is unlikely to develop on its own.
The purpose of the intervention is not to displace market forces with
permanent oversight, but rather to foster competition, by creating the
conditions necessary for competition to flourish. Once that goal has
been reached, the strong implication of this paper is that it is time for
regulators to pack up and go home. Of course, this is not to say that
even temporary regulation does not pose risks. Regulatory schemes,
once put into place, have proven notoriously difficult to dismantle.
But, the arguments presented here suggest that those risks may well
be worth taking, because the costs of not acting may be even greater.

